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BORDER SEARCHES IN A MODERN WORLD: ARE
LAPTOPS MERELY CLOSED CONTAINERS,
OR ARE THEY SOMETHING MORE?
KINDAL WRIGHT*
THE UNITED STATES District Court for the Central District
of California gave hope to travelers who wished to take
laptops across the border, but did not want the contents to be
examined by U.S. Customs in their decision in United States v.
Arnold.1 However, the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision in
United States v. Arnold,2 so travelers with laptops will continue to
worry that their private files will be searched at the border with-
out reasonable suspicion. Courts have determined that laptop
searches at the border do not require any amount of particular-
ized suspicion, and therefore suspicionless laptop border
searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment.3 Due to these
recent court decisions, businesses will have to reevaluate how
they conduct international business trips. Customs officials will
still be able to look at private, confidential client files that are
taken across the border, without reasonable suspicion. 4 Busi-
ness travelers will have to seriously consider whether or not they
should take their work laptops across the border and whether
their Blackberry or iPhone, containing confidential emails,
should also be taken across the border. In fact, business trav-
elers may have a duty to leave laptops at home when they con-
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law; B.A., 2006, Southern Methodist University. I would like to thank my
parents, Lemoine and Judy Wright, for all of the love and support that they have
given me through the years. Without their support I could have never
accomplished the things that I have done. I would also like to thank Professor
Craig Flournoy for always pushing me to reach my goals and encourging me to
never give up on my dreams.
1 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), overmled, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
2008).
2 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
3 See generally id.
4 See id. at 1008.
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tain confidential information.5 This article will discuss the
history of the border search exception to Fourth Amendment
protections, evaluate the current state of the law in U.S. Circuit
Courts, and will come to the conclusion that there should be a
strict policy put in place regarding laptop searches by customs
officials in order to protect U.S. business travelers from having
to make the choice between considerable expense to protect
confidential client files and having U.S. Customs view confiden-
tial client files. Part I will discuss the history of the border
search exception, Part II will focus on the current state of the
law concerning border searches, and Part III will discuss ways to
change the law in order to protect the constitutional interests of
travelers. If business travelers know that customs officials will
only search a laptop for physical things, such as bombs, then
they will be safe to take laptops containing confidential informa-
tion with them on international business trips. Courts have con-
sistently declined to apply a standard of reasonable suspicion for
border searches of laptops. If courts are unwilling to require
that border searches of laptops require reasonable suspicion,
then a new standard should be adopted that is below reasonable
suspicion but more than a suspicionless search in order to deal
with Fourth Amendment protections regarding modern tech-
nology. This new standard will help to balance the govern-
ment's interest in protecting the country, but will also protect
travelers' interests in their privacy when carrying laptops and
other electronic storage devices across the border. This article
will also conclude that the proper analogy for a laptop computer
should not be that of a closed container, but that of a physical,
bodily intrusion due to the large amount of personal memories
and personal documents that can be stored on computers.6 The
analogy to a closed container is a false representation of what
laptops actually contain-which can be as much information as
one would expect to find in a person's house.7
5 Rasha Alzahabi, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad?
The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REv. 161,
185 (2008).
6 See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006.
7 Brief for Ass'n of Corporate Travel Executives & Elec. Frontier Found. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 16, United States v. Arnold, 533
F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-50581).
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that
"[t] he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated."8 The Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect against general searches that have been "deemed obnox-
ious to the fundamental principles of liberty."9 The Supreme
Court has stated that the basic purpose of the Amendment is to
"safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbi-
trary invasions by governmental officials."1 ° The Fourth Amend-
ment should not be narrowly construed, but should instead be
liberally construed in order to protect the right of people to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.11 The Supreme
Court has determined that Fourth Amendment protection is not
based upon the mere fact that there was a physical intrusion, but
that it "protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. ' 12 The Fourth Amendment pro-
tections can be waived, though, if there is voluntary consent to
the search by the party being searched.13
B. EXCEPTIONS TO FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
However, the "Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into
a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'"14 Some exceptions
do exist to the Fourth Amendment's guarantees. One of these
exceptions includes "routine searches and seizures at the bor-
der."15 If a search falls under the border search exception, the
government may conduct the search "without probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, or a warrant. ' 16 Searches that occur at the
border are "reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they oc-
cur at the border."'1 7 A border search does not have to take
place at the exact border of the United States to be considered a
border search; it can also take place at the "functional
8 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
9 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
10 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
11 Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 357.
12 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
13 United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
14 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
15 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
16 United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2005).
17 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004).
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equivalent of a border," such as an American airport."8 In some
instances, border searches can also occur after the person or
property has left customs or the functional border.1" The pur-
pose behind border searches being an exception is that, "Con-
gress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct
routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable
cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties
and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this coun-
try."2 The United States has authority based on its inherent sov-
ereign authority, to search the baggage of international travelers
coming into the United States in order to "protect its territorial
integrity. 21
The Court recognized the border search doctrine exception
to the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Ramsey and therein
described the history of the exception.22 In this case, a United
States customs agent was inspecting mail when he found several
envelopes from Thailand, which were "bulky" and addressed to
four different addresses in Washington, D.C. 23 Since narcotics
are known to come from Thailand, and because the letters were
bulky and appeared to contain something that may have been
contraband, the customs inspector opened one of the letters
and found that it contained heroin. 24 The inspector then
opened the other seven envelopes that appeared bulky and
found that those also contained heroin.25 The envelopes were
then sent to Washington where a warrant was obtained, and the
packages were resealed and delivered under surveillance. 26 The
recipients of the packages were arrested, but they moved to have
the heroin suppressed, arguing that the search violated their
Fourth Amendment rights. 27 The court determined that the
search of incoming mail was constitutional under the border
search doctrine.28
Prior to the proposal of the Bill of Rights, the same Congress
that proposed the Bill of Rights, which includes the Fourth
18 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
19 United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1994).
20 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537.
21 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1007.
22 See generally United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
23 Id. at 609.
24 Id. at 609-10.
25 Id. at 610.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 610-11.
28 Id. at 624-25.
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Amendment, by statute "granted customs officials 'full power
and authority' to enter and search 'any ship or vessel"' which
they felt had "'any goods, wares or merchandise subject to
duty"' concealed onboard the ship.2' This power to enter ships
was differentiated from the limited power that officials had to
enter and search "'any particular dwelling-house, store, build-
ing, or other place,"' which would require a warrant in order to
search." The Court found it important that the same Congress
that proposed the Bill of Rights, which protected individuals
from unreasonable searches, enacted a statute which allowed
customs to search incoming vessels." The Congress must have
thought that customs searches of incoming vessels were reasona-
ble without a warrant since it failed to include those as searches
that were prohibited when proposing the Fourth Amendment. 2
Border searches, since before the Fourth Amendment was en-
acted, have been deemed reasonable for the mere fact that they
occur at the border, and the nation has a strong interest in pro-
tecting itself and not allowing contraband to cross the border
into the country.3 Therefore, travelers who enter the United
States may expect themselves and their property to be searched
without a warrant in order for the nation to protect itself from
the entry of contraband. 4 The Court affirmed the exception of
the warrantless search at the border and determined that enve-
lopes at the border were free to be searched without warrant
under the exception since they, like international travelers, were
entering the United States from another country.35 The Court
declined to afford any extra protection to letters simply because
they were mailed and not carried into the country.36
Searches at the border that do not require particularized sus-
picion are those searches of the following items: "(1) the con-
tents of a traveler's briefcase and luggage, (2) a traveler's 'purse,
wallet, or pockets,' (3) papers found in containers such as pock-
ets, and (4) pictures, films and other graphic materials. 31 7 In
general, courts have determined that closed containers and
29 Id. at 616.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 616-17.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 619.
-4 Id. at 618.
35 Id. at 620.
36 Id.
37 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted).
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their contents can be searched at the border without particular-
ized suspicion.3" The Supreme Court has determined that bor-
der searches of persons or packages "rest on different
considerations and different rules of constitutional law from do-
mestic regulations. " 39
An example of a border search that did not require particular-
ized suspicion occurred in United States v. Tsai.4" In Tsai, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents in Guam
stopped two passengers who were about to board a flight to Ha-
waii, and the agents discovered that the passengers were using
falsified passports in an attempt to enter the United States.41
INS discovered, while Tsai was on a flight from Guam to Hawaii,
that Tsai had stayed at the same hotel as the detained passen-
gers and that he was the only passenger to take the same flights
as the two passengers. 42 INS determined that Tsai was attempt-
ing to help the passengers enter the United States illegally.43
When Tsai arrived at the airport in Hawaii, INS agents met him
and detained him for an interview where an agent searched
through his bags and found airline tickets for the two passengers
who had used falsified passports.44 Agents informed him that he
was to be detained, and when the arrest warrant arrived, he was
arrested.45 Tsai argued that the search of his bags should have
required particularized suspicion because it was not a routine
search, and therefore, did not respect his Fourth Amendment
rights.4 6 Tsai argued that the search was not routine because
agents already suspected him of criminal activity in Guam, and
when they stopped him in order to interview him and search his
bags, it was for a criminal investigation and not for enforcing
immigration laws at the borders.4" The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that whether the search was for a criminal investi-
gation was not the standard of whether a border search was
"routine," but rather the characterization stems from an exami-
38 Id.
39 United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125
(1973).
40 282 F.3d 690 (2002).
41 Id. at 692-93.




46 Id. at 694.
47 Id.
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nation of how intrusive was the search.48 The court found that
the search was routine since a search of luggage is not as intru-
sive as a strip search, which invades a traveler's personal privacy
and requires particularized suspicion in the Ninth Circuit.4"
The court held that a warrant requirement cannot be imposed
on warrantless searches that occur at the border simply due to
the motivation behind the search." However, motivation is not
totally irrelevant when determining if Fourth Amendment pro-
tections have been violated.5" A border search may violate
Fourth Amendment rights if it is conducted, as a general
scheme, in order to primarily focus on criminal control pur-
poses.52 In the case of Tsai, the border search did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because it was an individual search of
Tsai, and an individual may be subjected to "broadly applicable
search schemes on the same basis as other individuals" if that
scheme does, in fact, apply to that individual.53 In Tsai's case,
the validity of the border search process in general was not in
question, it was merely his individual search, which the court
determined to be valid.54
C. REASONABLE SUSPICION
However, some searches at the border require "reasonable
suspicion" in order to be conducted in a constitutional man-
ner.55 Border searches that require reasonable suspicion are
those where the customs agents wish to do an alimentary canal
search.56 Reasonable suspicion is the correct standard in these
types of situations because it "effects a needed balance between
private and public interests when law enforcement officials must
make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause.
51 7
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, a woman arrived in
Los Angeles, California, on a flight from Bogota, Colombia, and
customs officials subsequently detained her under suspicion of








55 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 532-33.
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tions from the customs officials and after a subsequent strip
search, the officials suspected that she was a person "who at-
tempts to smuggle narcotics into this country hidden in her ali-
mentary canal."5 9 Customs officials gave the woman several
options, including having x-rays taken or being put on a return
flight to Colombia, and the woman chose to fly back to Colom-
bia.6 ° She was detained in the customs office and was informed
that if she had a bowel movement female customs officers would
"inspect her stool for balloons. '61 She remained in the customs
office for sixteen hours while waiting on the flight, and during
that time did not eat or drink anything, nor did she use the
restroom; thus, a court order was issued in order to conduct a
rectal examination, which led to the discovery of balloons of co-
caine.62 The Court determined that the customs officials must
have reasonable suspicion in order to detain the woman for ali-
mentary canal smuggling.63 The Court determined that the rea-
sonable suspicion standard for customs officials is that they
"must have a 'particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person' of alimentary canal smuggling."64 The
Court determined that there was reasonable suspicion in this
case.
65
"Real suspicion" is also required by Ninth Circuit courts when
a strip search is to be conducted. 66 "No one should be subject to
the indignity of' a search where the person has crossed the bor-
der and is required to undress and be subjected to a skin search
"unless there are compelling reasons to do so."67 In Guadalupe-
Garza, the Ninth Circuit illustrated this idea by determining that
the appellant's motion to suppress heroin recovered from a
strip search should be granted because the search was con-
ducted illegally.6" In that case, Guadalupe-Garza entered the
United States at Calexico, California, where a customs inspector
found him to be nervous and asked him to come into the cus-
toms office for questioning.69 The customs officer strip
59 Id. at 533-34.
- Id. at 534-35.
61 Id. at 535.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 541-42.
6 Id.
65 Id. at 542.
- United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
67 Id.
6 Id. at 880.
69 Id. at 877.
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searched him and, after doing so, noticed "hypodermic needle
marks" on his arm.70 Without giving Guadalupe-Garza any ad-
vice about his constitutional rights, customs officials took him to
the hospital where he was forced to take "oral emetics" and sub-
sequently "disgorged the contents of his stomach," which in-
cluded two balloons of heroin. 71 The court determined that in
order to balance protecting the rights of travelers and allowing
customs officials to efficiently do their jobs they would now re-
quire "'real suspicion' justifying the initiation of a strip
search. 72 The court articulated that real suspicion would re-
quire "subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable
facts" and that if a strip search was allowed to be conducted with
only subjective suspicion, then the "protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate. 73 In this case, the court deter-
mined that "the objective facts did not warrant a real suspicion
that appellant was concealing something on his person" and,
therefore, the motion to suppress the heroin that was recovered
from Guadalupe-Garza should be granted. 4
In United States v. Flores-Montano, the Court recognized that an-
other situation where particularized suspicion would be re-
quired is where there is a search that is destructive of property.75
In this case, customs officials stopped Flores-Montano when he
tried to drive into the United States in southern California.76
The customs inspector inspected the car and asked Flores-
Montano to leave the car, and it was taken to a second inspec-
tion. 7 At the secondary inspection a mechanic was called in to
remove the gas tank from the car.7 8 The tank was removed, and
the mechanic hammered off a "hardening substance that is used
to seal openings" from the tank, then opened an access plate
and discovered 37 kilograms of marijuana.79 The search of a gas
tank does not damage the vehicle because it is a brief procedure
that can be easily reversed.80 Flores-Montano filed a motion to
suppress the marijuana that was found during the search be-
70 Id.
71 Id. at 878.
72 Id. at 879.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 879-80.
75 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004).
76 Id. at 150.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 151.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 155.
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cause he felt that the search required reasonable suspicion, and
without reasonable suspicion, customs had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights."' The Court stated that there are certain
situations when a level of suspicion should be required in a bor-
der search but determined that searching a vehicle did not re-
quire a level of suspicion after comparing vehicle searches to the
search of a person.8 2 The Court recognized that a level of suspi-
cion should be required "in the case of highly intrusive searches
of the person-dignity and privacy interests of the person being
searched.""3 However, the Court declared that the "[c]omplex
balancing tests to determine what is a 'routine' search of a vehi-
cle, as opposed to a more 'intrusive' search of a person, have no
place in border searches of vehicles."8' The Court also recog-
nized that "some searches of property are so destructive as to
require a different result," but that in this case the search was
not destructive to the point to require a particularized suspi-
cion. 5 The Court determined that even though the search is
involved enough to interfere "with a motorist's possessory inter-
est," it is justified by "the Government's paramount interest in
protecting the border. '8 6
II. SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOPS:
CURRENT LAW
In United States v. Romm, the Ninth Circuit did not even discuss
whether a suspicionless search of a laptop at the border was dif-
ferent than a routine search of a closed container.87 Romm was
denied entry into Canada when a Canadian border official re-
quested that he turn his computer on and found child pornog-
raphy websites in Romm's internet history, which was in
violation of the terms of Romm's probation. 8 Romm then flew
into Seattle where U.S. customs agents, who had been informed
by Canadian officials that Romm was denied entry into Canada,
searched his laptop and found images of child pornography.8 "
Romm moved to suppress the evidence that was found during
81 Id. at 154.
82 Id. at 152.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 155-56.
86 Id. at 155.
87 See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (2006).
- Id. at 994.
89 Id.
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the search.9° Romm's main argument was that he had never of-
ficially crossed the border, so his search should not be consid-
ered a border search.91 However, the court determined that a
traveler who had been refused legal entry to another country
had to reenter the United States and was therefore subject to a
border search without a warrant or suspicion.92 After the court
determined that Romm was subject to a border search, it held
that the search of a laptop at the border was reasonable.9" The
court did not discuss the implications of a laptop search before
coming to its conclusion, it just stated that searches at the bor-
der are reasonable because they occur at the border, and there-
fore, since the search of Romm's laptop occurred at the border,
it was reasonable.94
A. ANALOGY TO CLOSED CONTAINERS
Certain courts have analogized laptops to closed containers,
which require no suspicion when being searched at the border.
Others have argued for a different analogy-to the human
body-so that suspicion will be required in order for customs to
search the contents of a laptop at the border. Travelers who
wish to have their personal information or confidential client
information on their laptops protected will want the courts to
analogize laptops to the human body so that customs officials
will have to have a level of suspicion before searching through
the contents of their laptops.
Travelers saw a glimmer of hope for protection of private in-
formation on their laptops in the recent United States v. Arnold
decision handed down by the Central District of California,
where the court held that the standard for border searches of
information stored on electronic storage devices should be rea-
sonable suspicion.9 In that case, Michael Arnold arrived at the
Los Angeles International Airport from the Philippines and was
selected for secondary questioning at customs.9 6 Customs offi-
cials began to inspect his luggage, "which contained his laptop
computer, a separate hard drive, a computer memory stick (also
9o Id. at 993.
91 Id. at 996.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 997.
94 Id.
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called a flash drive or USB drive), and six CDs."'97 A customs
official told Arnold to turn his computer on so that she could
see if it was working.98 After the computer had booted up, the
officials began to open folders that were on the computer's
desktop.99 The folders contained photographs of nude women
and other photographs and images, which the customs officials
believed depicted child pornography.' ° Arnold's computer
and storage devices were seized until federal agents received a
warrant to search them and then found more images in their
search. 1 ' Arnold subsequently brought a motion to suppress
the images that were found. 1 2
The court was determining an issue of first impression for the
Ninth Circuit-"whether the government can conduct a border
search of the private and personal information stored on a trav-
eler's computer hard drive or electronic storage devices without
Fourth Amendment review."' 0 3 The court recognized that its
decision in the case would have an important impact on border
searches because of developments in modern technology, which
allow "individuals and businesses to store vast amounts of pri-
vate, personal and valuable information within a myriad of port-
able electronic storage devices including laptop computers,
personal organizers, CDs, and cellular telephones."'1 4
The court determined that "opening and viewing confidential
computer files implicates dignity and privacy interests."'' 0 5 The
government argued that the search did not require reasonable
suspicion because the customs officials were searching Arnold's
laptop, a piece of tangible property, and not his person, so the
search was routine. 06 The court disagreed with this contention,
and found that the information contained on laptops and elec-
tronic storage devices "renders a search of their contents sub-
stantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a
lunchbox or other tangible object."'1 7 The court found that






102 Id. at 1000.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1003.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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tangible objects because they have the potential to contain "vast
amounts of information" such as personal "medical informa-
tion, photos and financial records" and, in the case of business
travelers, confidential client information or trade secrets. 10 8
The court concluded that a search of private, personal informa-
tion on a laptop or other electronic storage device could be 'just
as much, if not more, of an intrusion into the dignity and pri-
vacy interests of a person.., because electronic storage devices
function as an extension of our own memory."'1 Therefore,
the court concluded that "any border search of the information
stored on a person's electronic storage device be based, at a
minimum, on a reasonable suspicion." ' The court determined
that the government did not have a reasonable suspicion to
search Arnold's laptop and electronic storage devices, so it
granted Arnold's motion to suppress the images found on his
laptop."'1
On rehearing, the Association of Corporate Travel Executives
(ACTE) and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) wrote an
amici curiae brief in support of the district court's decision to
grant the motion to suppress.'1 2 The ACTE had an interest in
this case due to individual ACTE members who had been ran-
domly searched at the border and had their laptops seized and
because they have an interest in protecting the confidential in-
formation that is stored on their laptop computers.'1 3 The EFF
joined in the brief because they want the government to recog-
nize "the threats that new technologies pose to civil liberties and
personal privacy. '  In their brief, the ACTE and EFF argued
that the district court decision should be upheld because infor-
mation stored on a laptop is unique, and a standard should be
adopted to protect the privacy of citizens.115 The brief also ar-
gues that without a standard, the government can abuse its
power and avoid Fourth Amendment restrictions even with the
"particularly invasive and unconstrained nature of these
searches."116
108 Id. at 1003-04.
109 Id. at 1000.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1001.
112 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7.
113 Id. at 2.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 4.
116 Id.
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The government argued in its brief on the issue that the mo-
tion to suppress should be denied because courts have previ-
ously recognized that "[n]o suspicion is required to search
computer media at the border." '17 The government stated that
the court had used the wrong analogy when deciding what to
compare computers to-the court should not have analogized
computers with the human mind.11 The government argued
that computers should be analogized to other containers, those
which suspicion is not required to search at the borders, instead
of being differentiated from containers as the district court de-
scribed them. 119
Arnold also argued that a First Amendment exception should
be found to border searches being conducted without a stan-
dard of suspicion. 120 He stated that reasonable suspicion should
be required in border searches "where the risk is high that ex-
pressive material will be exposed" due to the principles of the
First Amendment.' 21
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision to grant Arnold's mo-
tion to suppress. 122 The court determined that the district
court's decision that found that particularized suspicion is re-
quired to search laptops at the border was incorrect due to an
erroneous basis on cases involving the search of a person. 23 Ar-
nold argued that the search of his laptop was so intrusive that
the search should have required suspicion. 124 The court re-
jected this argument, stating that the "prior approach of using
an intrusiveness analysis to determine the reasonableness of
property searches at the international border" should no longer
be used.125 The court recognized that some border searches of
property are "'so destructive as to require' particularized suspi-
cion," but determined that the search of Arnold's laptop was not
destructive, and therefore, did not require particularized suspi-
cion. 126 The court also rejected Arnold's analogy of a border
search of a laptop to a search of a home, which falls under the
117 Government's Opening Brief at 32, United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-50581).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 33.
120 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
121 Id,
122 Id. at 1010.
123 Id. at 1008.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1007-08.
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protection of the Fourth Amendment. 12 7 The Supreme Court
has declined to support such an analogy, "expressly rejecting ap-
plying the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to homes to
property which is 'capable of functioning as a home' simply due to
its size. ' 128 The court instead analogized a laptop to a container
and pointed out that the Supreme Court, for purposes of deter-
mining what level of protection should be required under the
Fourth Amendment, has refused to differentiate between con-
tainers of information and contraband "with respect to their
quality or nature.' 29 In short, the court determined that laptop
computers and electronic storage devices are considered noth-
ing more than containers for purposes of determining Fourth
Amendment protection and found that they deserved no partic-
ularized suspicion for border searches.1 3 0
In United States v. Roberts, the Southern District of Texas de-
nied a motion to suppress items found during a warrantless bor-
der search of the defendant's laptop as he was leaving the
United States.1 3 ' Roberts was leaving the United States on a
flight to France but was detained by a customs agent who had
been warned that Roberts would be coming through the airport
and possibly carrying child pornography. 32 The agent told
Roberts that he would have to inspect his computer and disket-
tes to see if they could be taken out of the country.1 3 3 Roberts
subsequently signed a consent form to allow customs to search
through his things but then argued for a motion to suppress,
stating that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.1 3 1
Roberts specifically argued that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because officials were attempting to use the
border search doctrine to avoid having to protect his Fourth
Amendment rights, which should not be allowed. 35 The court
rejected this argument and determined that border searches are
not required to be conducted using a certain policy, and this
border search therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment
if it was a valid search. 13
6
127 Id. at 1009.
128 Id. (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985)).
129 Id.
130 See generally id.
131 See generally United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
132 Id. at 680.
133 Id. at 681.
-' Id. at 681-82.
135 Id. at 682-83.
136 Id. at 686.
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The court determined that the search of Roberts's laptop and
diskettes was a "routine expert search" and was "valid under the
Fourth Amendment" because it did not seriously invade his pri-
vacy. 1 37 The court laid out the factors for considering intrusive-
ness of a traveler's privacy, as recognized by the First Circuit:
(1) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body
parts or requires the suspect to disrobe; (2) whether physical
contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs during
the search; (3) whether force is used to effect the search; (4)
whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger;
(5) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and (6)
whether the suspect's reasonable expectations of privacy, if any,
are abrogated by the search.13
The court recognized that strip searches and body-cavity
searches are non-routine, and that searches that destroy prop-
erty have been considered non-routine, but declined to con-
strue the laptop search as non-routine.1 39  This court also
analogized the laptop to a closed container. 140 The search of a
closed container, such as a piece of luggage, is considered a rou-
tine border search for purposes of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. 41 The court held that a "search of Roberts' [sic]
computer and diskettes would not have been destructive or so
personally invasive as to be nonroutine.1' 42 The court found
that the motion to suppress should be denied since the search
of Roberts' laptop did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights.143
In United States v. Ickes, Ickes was stopped at the border in or-
der for customs agents to search his van when he attempted to
enter the United States from Canada.144 Agents discovered a
videotape of a tennis match, which focused particularly on a
young boy, and were then compelled to search the van more
thoroughly, at which point they discovered marijuana and pho-
tographs of nude or semi-nude young boys. 145 Agents arrested
Ickes and continued to search the van, and they discovered a
137 Id. at 688.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 688-89.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 688.
143 See generally id.
1- 393 F.3d 501, 502 (4th Cir. 2005).
145 Id. at 502-03.
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computer and seventy-five disks containing child pornogra-
phy.146 Ickes filed a motion to suppress the contents of his com-
puter and the disks, arguing that the search had been a violation
of his Fourth Amendment and First Amendment rights.'4 7 The
court discussed the border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment and stated that the government has a larger inter-
est in a search at the border than the traveler has an interest in
protecting privacy since the traveler should not expect his pri-
vacy at the border to be as protected as it would be in his or her
own home. 48 The government has a greater interest than the
entrant since the government is trying to prevent the entry of
contraband into the United States in order to protect its
citizens. 4
9
Ickes attempted to argue that there should be a First Amend-
ment exception to the border search doctrine, stating that the
search of his computer was invalid because it "involved the
search of expressive material.' 150 The court rejected this argu-
ment since the main purpose of the border search doctrine is
for the United States to protect itself, and if the First Amend-
ment exception were to apply, the government would not be
able to search for terrorist communications, which the court
deemed to be expressive material. 15' If a First Amendment ex-
ception to the border search doctrine were granted, this "would
create a sanctuary at the border for all expressive material-
even for terrorist plans" and would "undermine the compelling
reasons that lie at the very heart of the border search doc-
trine. '"152 Moreover, if a First Amendment exception were
granted, this would cause many problems for officials who
would have to determine the scope of the exception in disputes
that may not be resolved easily. 15 The agents would first have to
determine whether the traveler was carrying expressive informa-
tion and if it was covered by First Amendment protections, and
if they determined it was material afforded protections by the
First Amendment, they would then have to decide if they had
146 Id. at 503.
147 Id.
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probable cause to search the material.' 54 This would cause too
many problems, especially given that the border search doctrine
was intended to be an expansive exception so that officials could
efficiently protect the country. 155 Thus, the court declined to
find a First Amendment exception to the border search doc-
trine.'56 Ickes also argued that a search of his laptop and the
court's decision in his case was too broad and meant that any
international traveler would be subject to a search of the files on
their computers.'5 7 The court declined to entertain this argu-
ment because they felt it was "far-fetched" since "[c]ustoms
agents have neither the time nor the resources to search the
contents of every computer.' 158 The court also felt that laptop
searches would not be initiated unless a customs agent had ob-
served behavior that they felt warranted a search and that the
"essence of the border search doctrine" relies on the observa-
tions of customs agents. 59 The court refused to see a constitu-
tional argument and determined that "to state the probability
that reasonable suspicions will give rise to more intrusive
searches is a far cry from enthroning this notion as a matter of
constitutional law."1 60
In United States v. Bunty, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a
court situated in the Third Circuit, held that the border search
of a laptop computer does not require reasonable suspicion. 61
In this case, Bunty was returning to the United States from
London, where he had been working for three weeks, when he
was stopped by customs officials for secondary questioning.1 62
Customs officials detained Bunty for secondary questioning be-
cause they had discovered his name in the National Criminal
Information Center database, which showed that he had been




157 Id. at 506-07.
158 Id. at 507.
159 Id.
16 Id. But, is this true? The Fourth Amendment was put in place to protect
against unreasonable searches, and the court simply dismisses the gravity of this
protection by stating that customs officials will not search any more than their
reasonable suspicion leads them to believe they should search. The author be-
lieves that Ickes had a valid constitutional argument against the search of the
contents of his laptop.
161 2008 WIL 2371211, *3 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
162 Id. at *1.
163 Id.
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tioning, agents searched through Bunty's luggage and discov-
ered two laptops, flash drives, floppy disks, and compact discs.
164
Agents decided to look through the files that were contained on
the disks, so they inserted them into a government computer
and searched the files to discover that they contained child por-
nography. 165 The agents also asked Bunty to enter his password
on the laptops in order for the agents to search the files they
contained, and after entering an incorrect password into one of
the laptops, agents informed Bunty that they would be keeping
the laptops for further inspection.16 6 Agents subsequently
found child pornography on the laptops and a warrant was is-
sued in order to conduct a search of Bunty's home where more
child pornography was found.167 After being indicted and
charged, Bunty moved for a motion to suppress the evidence
that was discovered in the border search and the evidence found
at his residence. 68 He argued that his Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated because the agents searched his com-
puter and electronic storage device without reasonable suspi-
cion.1 6 9 He argued that the warrant and search of his home had
resulted from the border search, and therefore, that evidence
should also be suppressed since the border search was unconsti-
tutional.170 The court stated that the Supreme Court had not
yet dealt with the issue of constitutionality of suspicionless
laptop searches at the border, thus it drew its reasoning from
other federal courts that had held that suspicionless laptop
searches at the border were routine, and therefore constitu-
tional under the border search exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment.17' The court determined that the border search was
routine because Bunty could point out nothing to distinguish it
from the other laptop searches that federal courts had deemed
needed no reasonable suspicion. 172 Furthermore, the court dis-
cussed that even if reasonable suspicion were required, the
agents who searched Bunty's laptop and electronic storage
equipment had reasonable suspicion. 173 The court determined
164 Id.






171 Id. at *3.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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that the reasonable suspicion standard had been met given that
the agents knew of Bunty's criminal record, saw a letter from his
probation officer giving him permission to travel to London,
and had reason to search his things since the floppy disks that
he carried with him could fit into neither of the laptop com-
puters he traveled with for work purposes.174 The court ulti-
mately denied his motion to suppress the evidence that had
been gathered at the airport and at his home. 17 5
In sum, modern courts have declined to give Fourth Amend-
ment protection to laptops and other electronic storage devices
during bordei searches. The courts have analogized laptops to
closed containers and have declined to require particularized
suspicion in order for customs agents to search through the ac-
tual files on a laptop or contained on another type of electronic
storage device crossing the United States border. 176
III. THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION SHOULD BE
CHANGED IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE
PRIVACY OF THOSE TRAVELING
WITH LAPTOPS
Border searches of the content on laptops and external media
storage devices, without a required level of suspicion, is a con-
troversial topic, but it does not need to be, since a standard can
be developed that promotes both the traveler's interests and the
government's interests. On one side, the government feels that
it should have the power to search through the files on a trav-
eler's laptop in order to protect the citizens of the United States
from the entry of contraband at the border.17 7 On the other
hand, travelers feel that their privacy is violated when customs
officials go through the files on their laptops, and business trav-
elers are dealing with the consequences of having confidential
information stored on their computers when traveling. Some
travelers who have confidential information on laptops and
iPhones have decided to delete email messages off of their
phones before entering the United States in order to protect the
confidential information from being exposed to a border
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See generally United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
177 See id. at 1007.
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search. 7 8 This can create not only a true inconvenience for
travelers, it also creates travelers who essentially have no privacy,
and the majority of which have done nothing wrong. Some trav-
elers may not even be aware of the implications of taking their
laptops on travels into the United States. In fact, according to a
survey conducted in October of 2006, only six percent of busi-
ness travel managers realized that customs agents can, at ran-
dom, seize computers at the border and copy and retain files on
the computer.
179
Modern courts that have dealt with the issue of border
searches of laptops have declined to offer Fourth Amendment
protection to files contained on computers or electronic storage
devices that travelers bring into the United States.180 However,
courts should recognize our changing technology and the impli-
cations that it has on those traveling across the border. The dis-
trict court decision in Arnold seemed to have correct reasoning
when it found that a border search of a laptop and electronic
storage devices should require particularized suspicion since it
"[i]mplicates [p]rivacy and [d]ignity [i]nterests of a
[p]erson."'' 1 Modern courts should follow the rationale of the
district court opinion in order to come to the correct conclusion
that laptop searches should require particularized suspicion.
Some argue that if the courts continue to uphold suspicionless
border searches of laptops it will "render meaningless the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 18 2
A. THE LAW SHOULD CHANGE TO FIT TECHNOLOGY
Laptops are not merely closed containers-they are unique
pieces of technology that allow people to save their most pre-
cious memories, important files, and confidential information
all in one place. Courts have gotten stuck by trying to analogize
laptops with things that courts have already determined do not
require particularized suspicion-closed containers."8 3 Laptops
178 Critics Worry About Laptop Searches at Border: Rummaging Through Gadgets
Brings Up Fourth Amendment Concerns, MSNBC, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/28113582/.
179 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 8.
180 See generally Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003.
181 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006), over-
ruled, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
182 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 2.
183 Alzahabi, supra note 5, at 180.
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are more than closed containers, though. Courts should look
outside of this analogy and recognize that computers implicate
something more than just a container. In fact, some people
have said that a laptop computer can "contain as much informa-
tion about us as our homes contain-perhaps more."184 When
the government searches through the files contained on a per-
son's laptop it is able to glean as much information as it would
be able to if it had extensively searched that person's home. 5
As people naturally presume the privacy of their homes, which is
protected under the Fourth Amendment, they also presume
that the contents of their laptops are private, even when they are
traveling. 86 A laptop is not often easily left at home. Travelers
may need to take their laptop with them but have no place to
store their files that are on the computer and so are forced to
take these private, confidential files with them. Should travelers
be punished by being subjected to suspicionless searches for in-
evitably having to carry around files that, if they could conve-
niently be, would be left at home? Some courts have even
recognized the privacy concerns that computers implicate by
stating that "'for most people, their computers are their most
private spaces. ' '" 8 7 The courts should recognize that a "stan-
dard that reasonably protects the privacy of our citizens" should
be required when it comes to border searches of information
contained on a laptop. 188
Moreover, if the courts are looking to analogize laptops to
something, they should find that computers are more accurately
analogized to the human body than to a closed container. The
Supreme Court has provided that particularized suspicion must
be required when an alimentary canal search is conducted due
to privacy interests.189 Particularized suspicion should also be
required when a laptop search is conducted because the infor-
mation contained on a laptop can implicate privacy interests in
much the same way that the alimentary canal search implicates
privacy interests.190 The courts should adopt the rationale of
184 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 12.
,85 Id. at 16.
186 See id. at 12.
187 Alzahabi, supra note 5, at 180 (citing U.S. v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189
(9th Cir. 2007).
l8- Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 4.
i89 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008).
90 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006), over-
ruled, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the district court in Arnold, when the court determined that the
search of personal information stored on a laptop or other elec-
tronic storage device "can be just as much, if not more, of an
intrusion into the dignity and privacy interests of a person." 9 '
The court determined that these privacy interests were impli-
cated because a laptop or an electronic storage device functions
"as an extension of our own memory."'19 2 Simply because the
search was not a physical search of the person does not mean
that it should not deserve Fourth Amendment protection when
the government is conducting such an invasive search into an
object that is "capable of storing our thoughts" and "vast
amounts of private, personal and valuable information." 93
However, the courts need not analogize a laptop to anything
in order to provide protection for private information stored on
a laptop. Laptops are unique-they are different from human
bodies and different from closed containers. The courts should
recognize this uniqueness and develop a new standard of partic-
ularized suspicion in order to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of travelers. The Supreme Court has before discussed the
need "that constitutional projections must evolve with modern
technology and social practices." ' 4 The computer has also
come to play a vital role in modern society, and the courts
should recognize this and be willing to create new law and break
from precedent in order to adapt constitutional standards to
modern living.19 5
B. DOES A LAPTOP SEARCH REALLY PREVENT CONTRABAND
FROM ENTERING THE COUNTRY?
The purpose behind the broad scope of the border search
exception to the Fourth Amendment is that the government is
seeking to prevent the entry of contraband into the United
States in order to protect its citizens. 19 6 However, the contents
of a laptop may enter the country even if customs officials stop
every international passenger and search their laptops for con-
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1000-01.
194 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 24 (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967): "To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.").
195 Id.
196 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005).
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traband. A computer is unique, and the files on it can be
emailed into the country. A person wishing to bring contraband
into the United States need not do more than hit the send but-
ton on their email-they would not have to go through the
lengths of flying internationally into the country with their
laptop in order to deposit the contraband. A smuggler need not
risk a suspicionless search at the border; they can email the con-
traband or "simply post the information on the internet" if they
desired to get contraband into the United States.19v There is no
reason that customs officials should have "unchecked power"'1 98
to search laptops because there is no guarantee that this would
even keep our citizens safe since the information can be trans-
mitted through the internet, and requiring a particularized sus-
picion would do no more to allow entry of contraband into the
country than would the internet.
A border search of a gas tank on a car does not require partic-
ularized suspicion since it is not an alimentary canal search and
does not implicate the privacy interests that come along with the
intrusion of a person, and it is not so destructive as to implicate
Fourth Amendment protections. 99 The search of a gas tank can
actually help the government to accomplish its goal behind the
border search doctrine of protecting citizens from contraband
entering the borders200 because there are only certain ways that
drugs may be carried into the country-and all require a physi-
cal border to be crossed. Since a physical border is required to
be crossed to get drugs into the United States, it is easy to see
that the government would need expansive border search au-
thority to search without suspicion if the search does not impli-
cate the physical privacy of a human and is not too destructive.
In the case of information contained on a laptop, this is simply
not the case. Requiring particularized suspicion would not un-
dermine the government's authority or purposes, since a physi-
cal crossing of the border is not the only way that contraband
contained on a laptop can enter the country.201 A valid reason
for searching a laptop without suspicion would be to have the
laptop simply opened and turned on in order to detect bombs
197 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 5-6.
198 Id.
- See generally United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
200 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506.
201 Alzahabi, supra note 5, at 177 ("Child pornography or other illegal photos
will still enter into our country, regardless of these suspicionless searches, due to
the nature of the Internet and electronic communications").
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or drugs which smugglers may try to hide in order to bring them
across the border.2 °2 This truly would comport with the govern-
ment needing to have expansive power to conduct border
searches in order to prevent contraband from entering the
country in order to protect its citizens.2 °3 Thus, when searching
a laptop, border officials should only be able to conduct
searches in order to ensure that physical contraband is not be-
ing brought into the United States.20 4 Clicking upon icons and
opening files on a traveler's computer does not check for physi-
cal contraband that can only enter the country physically, and
thus does not support the reasoning behind the border search
doctrine.20 5 Checking for physical contraband comports with
the rationale behind the border search exception since it will
truly keep contraband out of the country instead of searching
for contraband that could easily enter the country through
other means, such as the internet. 20 6
C. DEVELOPING A NEW STANDARD FOR LAPTOP SEARCHES
An argument has been made that "reasonable suspicion"
should be required before customs agents are able to search
laptops at the border. 20 7 However, since courts have been reluc-
tant to apply this standard, perhaps courts should look into
adopting a new standard specifically applicable to laptops.
Courts have declined to analogize the search of a laptop to a
search of a traveler's "alimentary canal," which would require
reasonable suspicion by officials before conducting the
search.20 8 If the courts will not find that a laptop should be pro-
tected against suspicionless searches by having a standard of rea-
sonable suspicion, just as the dignity of the human body should
be protected, then perhaps the courts should develop a stan-
dard lower than reasonable suspicion, but still higher than no
suspicion at all, in order to conduct a border search through all
of the files on a traveler's computer. This would strike a balance
between the government's desire to protect its citizens by
searching for contraband at the border, and protecting trav-
elers' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches.
202 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 6.
203 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506.
204 Alzahabi, supra note 5, at 177.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 185-86.
208 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008).
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This standard would still allow customs officials to conduct their
jobs, but would afford more protection to confidential and pri-
vate materials that passengers carry on their laptops. In fact, in
United States v. Ickes the court rejected Ickes' argument that if the
court upheld suspicionless border searches of laptops then every
international traveler could have their laptop searched because
the court felt customs agents did not have the resources, but
also because they most likely would only search through the files
of a laptop if they felt that there was a reason to do so given "the
traveler's conduct or the presence of other items in his posses-
sion suggest the need to search further."20 9 However, if the
court felt that the customs agents would only search through the
files on a computer when they felt there was a need to because
of the circumstances, why would the court have a problem with
determining that a laptop search requires particularized suspi-
cion? It seems that the court is already saying that there "most
likely" would be a particularized suspicion before a customs
agent entered into a search of a laptop.210 If this were truly the
case, then the court should have no problem with developing a
requirement of some type of particularized suspicion before a
laptop search is conducted at the border.
Developing a standard would help modern travelers save time
and expense when traveling internationally. Instead of travelers
taking the time to delete confidential emails and files off of
their laptops and Blackberrys before traveling and then synch-
ing them back with a computer left at the office or at home,211
travelers would know that customs officials would be required to
have a reason before searching through their computer files
and may feel more comfortable with traveling internationally
with their computer.
D. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD BE AN EXCEPTION
TO THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE
Border agents cross an "important constitutional threshold"
when they "cease looking for physical contraband inside a com-
puter and instead begin reviewing the electronic files on the
computer."212 The First Amendment protects certain "presump-
209 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2005).
210 Id. at 507.
211 See Critics Wary of Laptop Searches at Border: Rummaging Through Gadgets Brings
Up Fourth Amendment Concerns, supra note 178.
212 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 23.
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tively protected material" from searches conducted without sus-
picion.213 In searches where there is a search for and seizure of
"presumptively protected material," it is required that the
"Fourth Amendment be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude' in
such circumstances." 2
14
The contents of laptops can be the same content that courts
have already determined are presumptively protected material.
In United States v. Arnold, Arnold argued that a First Amendment
protection should apply to his case because there was a high risk
that expressive material would be exposed.215 He also argued
that the court should "promulgate a reasonable suspicion re-
quirement for border searches where the risk is high that ex-
pressive material will be exposed."216  The Ninth Circuit
incorrectly rejected Arnold's First Amendment argument by re-
lying on the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ickes,
where the court refused to find that the First Amendment
should create an exception to the border search doctrine.2 1 7
The Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment could not be
an exception, because if it were in effect it would "protect terror-
ist communications which are inherently expressive," would cre-
ate a standard which customs agents would not be able to use
since it would require them to decide which material was expres-
sive, and the exception would "contravene the weight of Su-
preme Court precedent" on the issue.218 Therefore, the court
determined that the material on Arnold's laptop could not be
protected by carving out a First Amendment exception to the
border search doctrine.219
The court in Heidy v. United States Customs Service conceded the
fact that customs agents may in fact have to briefly read docu-
ments in order to determine what they are, but that once agents
begin reading a document for the intellectual content, they
cross a First Amendment threshold which may encroach upon a
person's constitutional rights. 220 In Heidy, customs officials
213 Id. at 22.
214 Id. at 22 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965)).
215 533 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
216 Id. (It is safe to assume that when Arnold referred to "searches where the
risk is high that expressive material will be exposed" he was referring to laptop
searches when customs officials begin opening files on computers where expres-
sive material may be stored.).
217 Id. at 1010.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 681 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
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seized written materials from the plaintiffs, who were United
States citizens, as they returned to the United States from Nica-
ragua.22 1 Customs officials reviewed some of the materials in or-
der to see if they violated a United States statute that prohibits
persons from bringing materials into the United States that ad-
vocates treason or insurrection against the United States.222 In
reviewing the documents, customs officials made photocopies of
all of the documents.22 3 In the end, none of the materials the
customs agents reviewed violated the statute prohibiting the en-
try of treasonous materials.224 Plaintiffs contend that some of
the photocopies and records of the documents were not re-
turned, even though customs agents found that they did not vio-
late the statute. 25 In order to support their argument that
customs officials had misapplied the United States statute when
they searched the plaintiffs' documents and retained copies of
them, the plaintiffs argued that the customs officials had vio-
lated their constitutional rights when they conducted the search
and retained the documents.226 The plaintiffs argued that the
suspicionless border search exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment should end when "substantial encroachment on their first
amendment rights begins. ' 2 27 The court agreed with this state-
ment and recognized that customs officials reading materials for
the purpose of discovering the intellectual content of the mate-
rial encroached upon First Amendment protections. 228 The
court recognized that the purpose of the border search excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment was to prevent the entry of physi-
cal contraband into the United States, which was clearly
different from the intellectual content of written materials that
the plaintiffs were bringing into the country.2 29 The court stated
that items such as "[f] irearms, diseased foods and more recently
controlled substances (drugs)" were the physical items that the
border search doctrine intended to keep out of the United
States.230 The Heidy court recognized that intellectual content is
different from physical items that are crossing the border and
221 Id. at 1446.
222 Id.
225 Id. at 1447.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See id. at 1447-48.
227 Id. at 1449.
228 Id. at 1449-50.
22 Id. at 1450, n.14.
230 Id.
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that there should be a different standard applied in order to
protect First Amendment rights. 23 1 Courts today should recog-
nize this difference and the implications that it has on suspi-
cionless border searches of laptops. Laptops contain materials
with intellectual content and should be afforded at least some
particularized suspicion before files are opened and examined
in order to avoid the violation of First Amendment rights. 232
E. IMPLICATIONS IF THE LAW STAYS THE WAY IT IS TODAY
If courts continue to uphold suspicionless border searches of
laptops, the United States could have real problems concerning
Fourth Amendment protections and privacy implications. The
Supreme Court has stated that the basic purpose of the Amend-
ment is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. '233 The
Fourth Amendment was created by the Founders to protect citi-
zens from general searches that required no oversight.234 A "sus-
picionless unrestricted search of a laptop" is no different than
the general searches that the Framers were seeking to elimi-
nate. 235 If courts do not change how they rule on cases involv-
ing modern technology, "rules created to prevent general
searches for physical evidence may result in the equivalent of
general searches for digital evidence. 23 6 In fact, this was an ar-
gument of Ickes in United States v. Ickes. Ickes argued that if the
court upheld the suspicionless search of his laptop, then "'any
person carrying a laptop computer.., on an international flight
would be subject to a search of the files on the computer hard
drive.' ,,237 The court rejected this argument because they felt it
was too "far-fetched" since customs officials had neither the time
nor the resources to engage in a search of every person's laptop
computer.2 8 The court also thought that an invasive laptop
search would not be conducted unless a customs official had
reason to conduct the search.239 It may be the case today that
Ickes' argument is not logical because customs agents do not
231 See id. at 1450-51.
232 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 23.
233 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
234 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 17.
235 Id. at 18.
236 Id. at 19 (citing Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv.
L. REv. 531, 569 (2005)).
237 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2005).
238 Id. at 507.
239 Id.
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have the time nor the resources required to conduct a laptop
search of every international traveler, but what happens when
the technology advances to a state where it is quick to search a
laptop and customs does have the resources to conduct a laptop
search on every passenger?240 The number of computers that
the government searches at the border does not affect the con-
stitutionality of the search, 24' but the implication is that privacy
concerns regarding laptops will become more of a regularity
and that the courts should evaluate how it wants to handle the
precedent courts have established for suspicionless laptop
searches at the border. Some have also suggested that if cus-
toms officials are able to search laptops more quickly and easily
as technology advances, then this "may encourage the police to
use border search authority to look for evidence of other types
of crimes stored inside the suspect's machine. '"242
Laptop searches also have implications for business travelers
who travel with laptops that contain confidential information, or
at one point in time did contain confidential information. If
the business traveler accessed the information recently on his
computer, "the laptop may have created temporary files of the
information, which can be recovered through forensic examina-
tion," and "[d]eleted images or files can also be recovered by
forensic analysis. ' 243 Professionals who have confidential infor-
mation on their computers cannot risk confidential material be-
ing recovered through a forensic examination, so they may have
a duty to leave their laptops at home. 244 Businesses will now
have to analyze how they will conduct international travels and
decide if they want to risk confidential information being
searched or if they will need to come up with other options for
employees to conduct business while traveling abroad. Compa-
nies are now enacting new policies to limit the amount and type
of information that employees can carry on their laptops while
traveling internationally. 245 For example, if an employee was
carrying a laptop which contained personnel information, and
his laptop was searched at the border, then a number of privacy
240 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 20.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 21.
243 Alzahabi, supra note 5, at 185.
244 Id.
245 Jaikumar Vijayan, Travel Group Warns: Corporate Data at Risk From Laptop
Searches at Border, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.computerworld.
com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articled=9081358.
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246violations could be brought against the employee's company.
The law today on border searches of laptops is unclear for many
businesses.247 If the courts continue to have jurisprudence that
does not fully explain what is limited and what is not in laptop
searches, then companies may be enacting policies that they had
no need of, or may enact a policy that does not cover as many
things as it should and could eventually get them into trouble if
confidential information was downloaded from an employee
computer during a border search.
Some businesses have already enacted policies to deal with
border searches, such as a company whose owner had her
laptop containing company information confiscated at the bor-
der for no reason, and never returned.24" Her company then
enacted a policy that employees could only travel with laptops
that contained no company information, and then they can ac-
cess company information remotely. 249 Other companies have
instructed their employees to travel with "blank laptops" and
then to access company information via the internet.250 These
policies can put a strain on businesses and interfere with their
ability to conduct business efficiently, with no corresponding
benefit to protect the country. The information contained on a
laptop can easily enter the border through the internet, so busi-
nesses should not be forced to enact policies that hinder their
business for the chance that the government will catch contra-
band entering the United States through a suspicionless search.
The decision to require some level of suspicion at the border for
laptop searches would provide businesses with the opportunity
to carry laptops containing all of the business information they
need, while at the same time still protecting the citizens of the
United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
Modern courts need to change along with modern times and
changing technology. When the border search exception to the
Fourth Amendment was created, it is doubtful that anyone
thought that we would be dealing with massive amounts of per-
sonal and confidential information being carried across the bor-
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches: US. Agents Seize Tra-
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ders on electronic storage devices and laptops. The Supreme
Court has previously recognized that constitutional protections
need to "evolve" with changing technology, and the Court
should apply this same reasoning in order to change the law
regarding laptop computers and suspicionless border
searches. 251 The courts can no longer simply analogize a laptop
to a closed container because it happens to hold things. In-
stead, courts should recognize that laptops contain much more
information than a normal closed container can hold, and the
type of information that it usually contains has great implica-
tions for privacy concerns.252
Courts have also refused to impose a particularized suspicion
standard for border searches even though there could be a First
Amendment justification for requiring particularized suspi-
cion. 53 If courts refuse to imply a particularized suspicion be-
cause they have analogized a computer to a closed container,
they would have another justification for particularized suspi-
cion due to the protection of expressive material which is often
contained on laptops. 254 If nothing else, the Supreme Court
should decide that First Amendment protections are warranted
in border laptop searches, and customs officials should be re-
quired to have a particularized suspicion before they begin to
open files on a traveler's laptop.
Courts have declined to break from precedent and have de-
termined that laptop searches at the border do not require rea-
sonable suspicion.255  Courts have declined to apply the
reasonable suspicion requirement, but there are still great pri-
vacy issues that are implicated, indicating that there should be
some standard of suspicion required. Since courts have de-
clined to enact a standard of reasonable suspicion, a new stan-
dard should be created in order to protect the privacy of citizens
traveling with laptops and other electronic storage devices. A
new standard can be created that will protect the government's
interest in keeping citizens safe while, at the same time, protect-
ing the privacy of international travelers. Businesses are cur-
rently confused by the law regarding laptop searches at the
251 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 24.
252 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006), over-
ruled, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
253 Brief for the Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 22.
2- Id. at 23.
255 See generally United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
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border and are seeking clarification. 256 A new standard should
be created quickly so that travelers will be able to determine
whether they can bring confidential information stored on their
laptops on international trips. The Supreme Court should take
on the issue of suspicionless laptop searches and create a new
standard of particularized suspicion to protect the constitutional
rights of travelers, while at the same time providing for protec-
tion of United States citizens.
256 Vijayan, supra note 245.
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